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Non-binary gender concepts and the evolving legal treatment of UK transsexed
individuals: a practical consideration of the possibilities of Butler
By Alex Harris1
Abstract
This essay seeks to bridge the gap between the UK legal system’s treatment of
transsexuals and post-structuralist gender theory. It argues that whilst the greater
representation of transsexuals in UK legal discourse embodied in the Gender Recognition Act
is a positive move forward in terms of classic liberal notions of human rights and in its
acceptance of transsexuals as proper subjects before the law, it nonetheless represents an
essentialist conception of transsexuals; requiring them to ‘fit’ within binary categories of
male and female. It is argued that post-structuralist thought regarding gender can illuminate
some of the problems inherent within the UK legal system’s treatment of transsexuals and
particularly focuses on the work of Judith Butler. There is further detailed consideration of
the UK legal system’s treatment of transsexuals prior to the Gender Recognition Act and a
response to some of the criticisms levelled at the applicability of Butlerian thought to realworld scenarios.
Key words: transsexuals, judith butler, gender recognition act 2004

Introduction
‘How human beings should be represented in social thought is a pressing
moral question, but whether they should be represented is not’ (Binder &
Weisberg, 1996-1997: p. 1151).
What, if any, is the place of post-structuralism in human rights law? Post-structuralism
can be broadly conceptualised as a scepticism of the enlightenment – scepticism of the belief
in the ability of language or discourse to accurately represent truth (Belsey, 2002: p. 10).
Meanwhile, the English legal system’s human rights jurisprudence still owes much to the
Enlightenment – a belief in, amongst many other things, individual freedom and personal
autonomy and on the reliability of scientific truth. The goal of this essay is certainly not to
impugn or disavow the entire trajectory of human rights law and jurisprudence, but to
question its application to the rights of transsexuals in the English legal system. What if the
current framework of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 is inadequately representing the
rights and the legitimate expectations of the subjects which it claims to represent? If the
current ‘truth’ is failing in its goals of democratic representation – could there therefore be
scope for accommodation of other forms of ‘truth’ within the legal discourse?
This essay will critically consider this possibility and ask in particular whether poststructuralist thought regarding gender has any applicability in the legal treatment of
transsexed individuals in the law in light of the Gender Recognition Act 2004. The Act gives
individuals the right to apply to have their legal gender reassigned, provided the subject ‘has
lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years ending with the date on which
the application is made’ and ‘intends to continue to live in the acquired gender until death’
(Section 2 (1) (b)-(c)). It will be argued that this piece of legislation is ultimately essentialist
and suffers from the same adherence to supposedly objective gender criteria of male and
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female which stand in contrast to non-binary conceptions of gender articulated by poststructuralism which, it will be argued, presents a more accurate representation of the means
by which gender identity is presented in the case of transsexuality. This essay will begin with
an assessment of the theoretical background of post-structuralist thought regarding gender as
an analytical framework for the legal analysis which follows. Particular attention will be
drawn to the work of Judith Butler, whose conception of gender performativity and fluid,
non-binary conceptions of gender run alongside the case of transsexuality (medicalised as
gender dysphoria). Whilst there are, of course, strains of post-structuralism distinct from
Butler’s, since Butler’s philosophy forms the most substantive attempt to apply poststructuralism to gender, it is perhaps the one most relevant for a critique of the law relating to
transsexuals. As Sandland argues, the case of transsexuality forces law into ‘revealing the
contingency of its claim to truth’ (1995), since transsexuality seems to disrupt the notion of a
rigid separation between male and female, a separation which leaves little room for
ambiguity. Finally, a critical analysis of the capabilities of Butlerian conceptions of gender
will be applied to question what practical applicability, if any, post-structuralist thought has
for the English legal system’s treatment of so-called transgender subjects.

Transgender vs. Transsexed
A crucial precursor to our discussion is the submission that the term transgender is
itself a misnomer (Whittle, 2002: p. 7). As McGuiness and Alghrani note regarding
individuals who undergo sexual reassignment surgery, whilst the biological ‘sex’ of the
individuals is changed, ‘[t]he gender of these individuals remains constant’ (2008: p. 264).
This echoes the distinction between sex and gender implied by Beauvoir’s notion that ‘one is
not born, but rather becomes, a woman’ (1988: 295) - the act of birth being the biological
‘truth’ of the child’s sex, the act of ‘becoming’ the discursive social construction of gender. In
the case of sexual reassignment surgery, the ‘becoming’ is biological and the gender of the
individual remains the same. The submission, therefore, is that individuals who have
undergone sexual reassignment surgery are referred to as transsexed and not transgendered.
For the purposes of this essay the former term will be favoured. It should be noted that, in a
political and legal context, oftentimes the terms sex and gender are mistakenly used
interchangeably and as though they were synonymous. For instance, in Parliament’s debate
over the Gender Recognition Bill at (HC Deb, 2004). Also in Goodwin v UK (2002) and in
Bellinger v Bellinger ‘for present purposes the two terms are interchangeable’ (2002: 1177).

Essentialism and legal conceptions of gender
In order to critique the essentialism of the law regarding transsexed individuals, it is
first necessary to briefly outline what is meant by the term essentialism and how the law can
be shown to operate according to this framework. Essentialism is a term subject to a variety
of definitions and reconstitutions. The Oxford English Dictionary defines essentialism as
‘[t]he belief in real essences of things, esp. the view that the task of science and philosophy is
to discover these and express them in definitions’ (2010). Essentialism regarding individuals
is, Mackie notes ‘the view that individual things have essential properties, where an essential
property of an object is a property that the object could not have existed without’ (2006: p.1).
In terms of gender, therefore, the essentialist conception holds that there are two binary
categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ and that each of these categories has certain properties
which precede its definition. For our purposes, however, it will not be necessary to embark on
an exhaustive account of the varied and nuanced accounts of different kinds of essentialism in
the hope that we may arrive at a constitution of essentialism itself, for such an effort would be
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consigned to inadequacy. What will be necessary, however, is to discuss in what ways the
legal treatment of transsexed individuals can be said to be essentialist. In other words: what
are the essential qualities of essentialism and, furthermore, how are these in operation
regarding the legal treatment of transsexuals?
The most notorious legal example of gendered or sexual essentialism is the test set out
by Ormrod J. in Corbett (1971), in which essential qualities fixed at birth define for legal
purposes the sex of the legal subject. Even the more recent House of Lords decision in
Bellinger, an otherwise progressive judgment, is somewhat essentialist, referring to the need
for ‘objective criteria by which gender reassignment treatment could be assessed...’ (2003).
Furthermore, even the Gender Recognition Act 2004, a comparatively progressive piece of
legislation, begins with the requirement that subjects who seek to have their gender legally
reassigned must be ‘living in the other gender’ (s 1 (1) (a)). The notion of there being fixed
categories of ‘men’ and ‘women’ which can be ascertained by reference to supposedly
objective characteristics has been criticised (Cowan, 2005) and will be discussed at greater
length below.

Butler’s Conception of Gender
If gender remains constant in the case of transsexed individuals, and the Gender
Recognition Act requires individuals to be living in ‘the other’ gender, the first question to be
asked is: what is the factor which remains constant; in other words - how may we seek to
arrive upon a definition of gender? Turning back to Beauvoir’s conception of woman as the
‘other’ to the ‘one’ of man, Irigaray supposes that the construction of binary gender
categories (though she does not use the term ‘binary’) of male and female to be a more
violent, ultimately hedonistic form of privileging the masculine in assigning definition to
gender, characterised on ‘masculine parameters...the vagina is valued for the lodging it offers
the male organ when the forbidden hand has to find a replacement for pleasure-giving’
(Irigaray, 1985). For instance, the Freudian notion of penis envy (Freud, 2009) is, for Irigaray,
a hegemonic reiteration which devalues the feminine as merely supplementary to the
hegemony of the ‘male’ (Irigaray, 1985: p.23) - ‘...there is no possible place for the
“feminine”, except the traditional place of the repressed, the censured’ (Whitford, 1991:
p.118).
Butler begins Gender Trouble with a consideration of both Beauvoir and Irigaray.
Whilst Beauvoir ‘turns to the failed reciprocity of an asymmetrical dialectic’, Irigaray
‘suggests that the dialectic itself is the monologic elaboration of a masculinist signifying
economy’ (Butler, 2008: p.18). Butler’s suggestion is that feminist critique continues to
explore and (presumably) reject the ‘totalizing claims of a masculinist signifying economy,
but also remain self-critical with respect to the totalizing gestures of feminism’ (Ibid). This
bears the characteristic hallmarks of Butler’s dense and difficult style, but can be summed up
as a rejection of the means by which feminism itself relies on a) the discursive construction of
two demarcated gender categories and b) a conception of female identity as somehow
universal or unique – that there is some shared experience of womanhood through which
individuals can be united. It is from this starting point that Butler develops the concept of
gender performativity, which is itself a blend of Foucault’s conception of repressive power’s
presence in discursive regimes of truth (Foucault, 1991) with Derrida’s deconstruction and
notions of iterability (Derrida, 1976) and Hegelian existentialism (Boucher, 2006: p.115).
Butler’s theory furthermore relies on Althusser’s interpolation – a theory of subjectformation, which is in itself an echo of Lacan’s ‘mirror stage’ (Lacan, 1953: pp.11-17).
Althusser’s theory of interpolation posits that individuals are all always existing within an
ideology, and that individuals enter an ideology through the mistaken perception that they are
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its subjects (Althusser trans. Brewster, 1971: pp. 127-186). Similarly, Butler’s conception of
gender relies on the subconscious reiteration of a perceived notion of what constitutes the
assigned gender role – male or female; ‘...a subject is hailed, the subject turns around, then
accepts the terms by which he or she is hailed’ (Butler, 1995: 6). As Boucher notes, ‘because
this effect of “hailing” is not a singular act, but a continuous repetition of ideological
interpolations, the subject-citizen is constantly demonstrating their innocence through
conformist practices’ (2006: p.120). If Butler is therefore correct, what is apparent in the case
of gender is that the legal means by which legal subjects are either ‘male’ or ‘female’ is
merely an instance of the law recognising a phenomenon which it is itself reproducing, rather
than representing a ‘truth’ or ‘reality.’

Gender Performativity
A key part of Butler’s thought on gender is her notion of gender performativity and
Butler’s use of the term ‘performativity’ and not ‘performance’ raises the question of how the
former is distinct from the latter. In the preface to Bodies that Matter, Butler explains that one
engaging in gender performance would be an ‘instrumental subject, one who decides on its
gender.’ Such a subject ‘fails to realize that its existence is already decided by gender’ (Butler,
1993). In other words, ‘performativity is not the act by which a subject brings into being what
she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena
that it regulates and constrains...’ (Ibid: 2) Also, Gangé et al note ‘...gender [and] gender
identity is learned and achieved at the interactional level, reified at the cultural level, and
institutionally enforced via the family law, religion, politics, economy, medicine and the
media’ (1997: p.479). This echoes Foucault’s theory of sexual discourse, in which discursive
constraints on what is acceptable and unacceptable modes of analysing and referring to sex
and sexuality is a biopolitical practise, by which individuals are subject to regulatory
practises defined by medical (and supposedly objective) parameters (Foucault, 1997). Sex is
therefore as much a discursive construction as gender inasmuch as sex is a conception which
brings together different elements or parts of bodies into an objective ‘truth’ of the body.
For the purposes of our critique, therefore, essentialism, by means of its preference of
the binary, cannot be a sufficient means of ascertaining an apparently enigmatic and elusive
‘truth’ of gender. The assumption that there must be legally defined categories of men and
women is the result of a hegemony in which law is the signifier and final arbiter in who is
male and who is female, without consideration of subjects which may disrupt this framework.
Claims to law’s objectivity regarding even the supposedly objective reality of sex is, in fact,
as much subjected to repetition and rearticulation as the traditionally more fluid idea of
gender. This echoes Monique Wittig, who argues that the construction of ontological
difference via sexual, biological essentialism inevitably implies oppressive social categories
of ‘one’ and the ‘other’, similar to Nietzschean masters and slaves, at least insofar as no
agency to be ‘good’ or ‘evil’ in those setting the terms of discourse need be present, only
those with power (the one; or the master) and those without (the other; or the slave)
(Nietzsche, 1956: p.147) In ‘The Category of Sex’, Wittig argues:
‘[d]ominance provides women with a body of data, of givens, of a prioris,
which, all the more for being questionable, form a huge political construct,
a tight network that affects everything, our thoughts, our gestures, our acts,
our work, our feelings, our relationships’ (Wittig, 1992: p.4).
It is, in other words, only possible to arrive at the hegemony of ‘gender’ by means of a
discursive formation of ‘sex.’ Therefore, whilst gender is increasingly accepted as having a
60
Journal of International Women‘s Studies Vol 13 #6 December 2012
https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol13/iss6/6

4

Harris: Non-binary Gender Concepts

psychological component, the masking of sex behind the veneer of scientific and, therefore,
unquestionable objectivity forces people into one of two essential identities of either ‘male’
or ‘female’ which designates individuals with an identity which they are unable to choose for
themselves and which is permanent (Herstein, 2010: p.50). As will become apparent, the
Gender Recognition Act does little to change this – it simply reiterates the supposed
permanence of gender and makes the reassignment an irreversible grant of a new gender (or,
more accurately, a negation of the old) through parameters agreed upon by the state (see:
Grabham, 2010: p.109).
The legal treatment of transsexed individuals – an evolving human rights issue
Historical binary subversion
Before discussing the recent developments in the legal treatment of transsexed
individuals, it should be noted that sexual transgression in terms of subversion of the binary
conception of gender is not new. In fact, subversion of binary gender norms has a long
history, with fourth-century Christian writers bemoaning the Roman pagan gali’s ‘deplorable
mockery...[of] men taking the part of women, revealing with boastful ostentation this
ignominy of impure and unchaste bodies’ (Roscoe, 1996: pp.195-230). Similarly, so-called
‘gender transgression’ has been shown to occur in the ancient Mesopotamian region of Akkad
and with the hijra of modern-day India and Pakistan (Ibid). Whilst an in-depth discussion of
historic transgressions of gender categories is outside the scope of this essay, it is useful to
note that subversion of ordinary gender roles is historically common and may, in fact, be
considered as a societal norm; as something to be expected rather than treated as a mere
statistical anomaly or cultural peculiarity.

Gender at common law: Corbett v Corbett
Perhaps the most well-known modern legal case concerning transsexed individuals is
the first instance decision of Corbett v Corbett (1971). The case concerned the petitioner’s
desire to have his marriage to a transsexual individual nullified on the basis that the person to
whom he was married had undergone sexual reassignment surgery and was, therefore,
biologically still male. As marriage was, by its legal definition, a union between a man and a
woman (Hyde, 1866; Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s 11 (c)) the only possible legal outcome,
it was argued, was for the marriage to be declared null. Ormrod J., himself a former doctor,
ruled in favour of the petitioner, establishing that it was not only necessary to establish that
the respondent, the transsexual April Ashley (who had for some time been working as a
successful female model), was either a man or a woman, but also that sex is an essential
biological fact, fixed at birth. (Corbett, 1971: 106) Even prior to the recent legislative
reforms, the decision in Corbett was criticised heavily by academics and by other judges, for
instance, Martens J’s dissent in Cossey v UK was critical of Corbett and of the UK’s
treatment of transsexuals in general, characterising it as ‘instinctively hostile and negative’
(1991: p.646). As Kavanaugh argues, Ormrod ‘erred when suggesting that a male to female
transsexual cannot perform the essential role of a woman in marriage, without defining what
this essential role is’ (2005: p.23). Kavanaugh further argues that supposed ‘essential’ roles of
women in marriage (such as the ability to have children) have never been grounds for
divorce. Kavanaugh’s critique is particularly useful for our discussion, as it highlights the
point that the attempt to define men and women with regards to their essential characteristics
in Corbett is an attempt to impose essentialism onto subjects before the law; specifically
allowing judges the role of deciding what is a man and what is a woman, without questioning
the assumptions upon which essentialism is based. Furthermore, Whittle notes that Ormrod J
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‘constantly mixed the notions of “male and female” with those of “man and woman” and that,
‘[h]e argues that marriage is a relationship based on sex rather than gender’ (1996: p.366).
Finally, Whittle criticises the essentialism in Corbett by considering Ormrod J’s judgment
that normal intercourse was not possible on the grounds that the respondent had an artificial
vagina: ‘the construction of an artificial vagina is not restricted to transsexuals, for some
women also have reconstructive surgery in acute cases of vaginal atresia (absence or closure
of a normal body orifice) before they are able to have sexual intercourse. Are these people
“not women?” (Ibid: 367). The submission, therefore, is that Ormrod J’s decision in Corbett
was wrongly decided precisely because it relied on a branch of biological essentialism and
the supposed certainty inherent in marriage as a union based on sex as opposed to one based
on gender.

Understanding Corbett via Butler
Butler’s submission is in fundamental opposition to the essentialism of Ormrod J in
Corbett. In Gender Trouble, she wonders ‘[w]hat separates off ‘the body’ as indifferent to
signification, and signification itself as the act of a radically disembodied consciousness or,
rather, the act that radically disembodies that consciousness?’ (2008: p.176). This view is
echoed by Irigaray, who supposes that in fields of discourse which claim objectivity (though
Irigaray is specifically addressing science, we can presume to extend her critique to the
supposedly objective or at least unbiased discipline of legal judgments), ‘[e]very piece of
knowledge is produced by subjects in a given historical context. Even if that knowledge aims
to be objective, even if its techniques are designed to ensure objectivity, [these forms of
knowledge] always display certain choices...determined by the sex of the scholars involved’
(Irigaray, 1993: p.204).
Though Ormrod J. made some acknowledgement of the distinction between sex and
gender (Corbett, 1971: p.107), the submission of Butler and Irigaray is that a simple
declaration of the objective reality of sex as distinct from the performative gender is
insufficient. If we apply Butler directly to Ormrod J’s judgment in Corbett, the permeating
need to establish a category of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ is indicative of a ‘homophobic signifying
economy’ which aims to avoid ‘polluted’ categories of persons (i.e. non-heterosexual)
(Butler, 2008: 180). Indeed, one senses a certain kind of squeamishness in the language used
in the judgment in Corbett, with its descriptions of homosexuals as ‘sexual deviants’ and its
regard of the facts as ‘essentially pathetic’ (1971: p.92) (Martens J, in his dissenting judgment
in Cossey also sensed this, noting Ormrod’s ‘[use of] terms which scarcely veil his distaste’
(1991: p.644)). Even if one sets aside this rather unfortunate use of language as mere rhetoric
or simply irrelevant and instead treat Corbett as an exercise in biological essentialism, it is
nonetheless indicative of a hegemony which treats bodies as the central focus of the law
surrounding transsexuals - as structural, immovable totalities onto which, Butler argues,
gender is subsequently inscribed (Butler, 2008: p.186). The preference of biological
characteristics (specifically chromosomal, genital and gonadal) factors in determining sex
was upheld and extended from the realm of merely family law to English criminal law by the
Court of Appeal in the criminal case R v Tan, in which Parker J. rejected the defendant’s
submission that psychological factors be taken into consideration for the purposes of the
Sexual Offences Acts of 1956 and 1967 (1983: p.1064). Tan therefore widened the scope of
the Corbett method of determination of sex beyond family law and, holding that a postoperative male-to-female transsexual would be convicted as a male living on the earnings of
prostitution.
The legal system in the UK has more recently recognised the rights of transsexuals,
with the introduction of the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999 (SI
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1999/1102) prohibiting discrimination of transsexuals largely in the field of employment
(with an exception for appointment of religious ministers). Subsequently, the courts were
more sympathetic in their judgments concerning transsexuals, as in the case of A v Chief
Constable of West Yorkshire Police (2005) in which a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual had been refused employment on the basis that she would not be able to carry out
all her duties as a police constable, specifically the requirement in section 54(9) of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 that personal searches of detained persons be conducted by
someone ‘of the same sex as the person searched.’ Lord Bingham rejected the reasoning of
the Chief Constable, stating that nobody who was of the same gender as the one the postoperative transsexual could reasonably object to intimate searches (A, 2005: 58). Legal rights
of transsexuals were further recognised by the UK Government’s April 2000 Report of the
Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People (2000: Web) which, whilst not
explicitly recommending any change in the way the UK treats transsexual citizens,
nonetheless outlined possibilities for reform in the UK legal system for gender reassignment.
In terms of UK domestic case law, perhaps the most significant recent judgment prior
to the 2004 Gender Recognition Act is Bellinger v Bellinger. The case involved a postoperative male to female transsexual, who sought a declaration that her marriage to her
husband was valid under the Family Law Act 1986. The Court of Appeal relied on the
standard Corbett test to declare that the marriage was invalid (Bellinger, 2002). On appeal to
the House of Lords, this declaration of invalidity was ultimately upheld (Bellinger, 2003).
What distinguishes Bellinger from judgments like Corbett, however, is the detailed
recognition of the existence of gender dysphoria and its importance in the assignment of
gender recognised in Lord Nicholls’ judgment (Ibid: 471). Furthermore, Lord Nicholls
acknowledged that s 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act was incompatible with the
European Convention. The reason for upholding the Court of Appeal’s decision was one of
constitutionality, rather than issues surrounding gender á la Corbett – that matters of such
importance should be for Parliament to decide and not the courts. Nonetheless, Bellinger, as
mentioned above, still demonstrates jurisprudential insistence on essential fixed categories of
men and women, determined by an underlying, unalterable scientific ‘truth’: ‘[i]ndividuals
cannot choose for themselves whether they wish to be known or treated as male or female.
Self-definition is not acceptable. That would make nonsense of the underlying biological
basis of the distinction’ (Ibid: 477). What is clear from even a relatively forward-thinking
judgment like Bellinger is, as Cowan notes, that the ‘law continues to engage with
transsexuality in a way that attempts to biologise and heterosexualise even the ‘queerest’
subject (Cowan, 2004: p.91). Jurisprudentially, therefore, ‘transsexuals certainly do not
constitute a third sex’ (P v S and Cornwall County Council, 1996) and the ‘recognition’ of
transsexuals is at its heart an assimilation of the transsexual subject into the binary
heteronormative order – the transsexual is forced to choose between one or the other and
have done with it.

Strasbourg jurisprudence
In the past, the European Court of Human Rights allowed the UK a fairly wide margin
of appreciation in denying transsexuals the legal recognition of their gender. The first case in
which a transsexual made an application under the ECHR was Van Oosterwijck v Belgium
(1981) in which the applicant, a Belgian lawyer, argued that the Belgian legal requirement to
carry identification everywhere constituted a violation of his Article 8 and Article 12 rights
(respectively: right to respect for private and family life and right to marriage). The court
found that there had been a violation of both Article 8 and Article 12 rights, but that as
domestic remedies for those breaches had not been exhausted, the court was unable to hear
63
Journal of International Women‘s Studies Vol 13 #6 December 2012
Published by Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University, 2012

7

Journal of International Women's Studies, Vol. 13, Iss. 6 [2012], Art. 6

the case on its merits. The first European case concerning UK transsexuals was Rees v UK, in
which the facts were similar, but allowing a wide margin of appreciation to the UK in the
absence of a European consensus, the UK’s refusal to issue a new birth certificate to a postoperative transsexual was found to not be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
Subsequently, there were some piecemeal developments in the legal status of transsexuals in
the UK, such as the above-mentioned P v S and Cornwall City Council (1996) in which it
was held that discrimination based on gender reassignment was a violation of Article 5(1) of
Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 (forbidding workplace discrimination
based on sex). The wider picture, however, was left largely unchanged and the legal status of
transsexuals remaining in their birth gender remained.
The two most important modern European judgments regarding the legal status of
transsexuals in the United Kingdom are the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions in
Goodwin v UK (2002) and I v UK (2003). In Goodwin, the applicant, a male to female postoperative transsexual, alleged that the failure of the United Kingdom to recognise her as a
female for the purposes of social security, pensions and retirement age constituted a breach of
Article 8, Article 12, Article 13 and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(Respectively: right to respect for private and family life, right to marriage, right to an
effective remedy for breaches of the convention and protection from discrimination). The
ECtHR held that there was a violation of Articles 8 and 12 (and Article 14, though there were
no further legal issues raised by that Article in particular). Furthermore, she had undergone
harassment at work, resulting in a sexual harassment case in the Industrial Tribunal, which
failed because she was considered by law to be a man (2002: 455). The ECtHR gave a
detailed overview of the evolving status of UK transsexuals, noting that out of the 37
Member States of the Council of Europe, only four (including the UK, the others being
Ireland, Andorra and Albania (BBC News, 2002: Web) did not permit a change of birth
certificate after gender reassignment surgery (Goodwin, 2002: p.465). The distinction from
Rees, then, was that a consensus could now be said to exist on the legal status of transsexuals
across member states. Furthermore, the court considered the legal status of transsexuals in
other jurisdictions, particularly the Australian case of Re Kevin which made explicit reference
to the Corbett test, rejecting it on the basis that it ‘would impose indefensible suffering on
people who have already had more than their share of difficulty, with no benefit to society’
(2001). Specifically, Goodwin rejected Corbett-style biological essentialism: ‘[t]he Court is
not persuaded therefore that the state of medical science or scientific knowledge provides any
determining argument as regards the legal recognition of transsexuals’ (2002: p.473). The
facts and legal issues in I were virtually identical, differing in largely superficial ways and so
a detailed examination of both cases is not necessary. It need only be mentioned that the
rejection of Corbett essentialism was identical in I as it was in Goodwin, to the point where
both judgments use the same phrase to rule against Corbett. (I, 2003: 63).

Statutory framework: The Gender Recognition Act 2004
The debate
As a result of Goodwin and I, the UK government began debating a Gender
Recognition Bill designed to give rights to transsexuals who were living ‘in a state of limbo,
between the gender in which they are living and the gender in which they were born; because
that is how the law defines them’ (HC Deb, 2003: Col 66-68). The second reading of the
Gender Recognition Bill further refers to the need to ‘enable same-sex partners to acquire a
legal status for their relationships’ (HC Deb, 2004: Col 48) (this, presumably, refers to the
Ormrod J’s declaration that the marriage in Corbett was null and void due to the petitioner’s
status as a male transsexual). Though there was some Conservative opposition to the bill per
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se (Mr. Andrew Robathan MP dismissed it as ‘the most arrant nonsense’) (Ibid: Col 53) the
general consensus in Parliament was that gender dysphoria was a medical condition ‘whereby
a person feels driven to live in the opposite gender’ (Ibid: Col 55). The issue, then, was a
classical liberal, rights-based issue of the human rights of transsexuals to ‘enjoy the rights
and responsibilities appropriate to their acquired gender...’ (Ibid: Col 57).

The Act
The Gender Recognition Act was ultimately passed and goes some way to addressing
the long standing problems inherent in the Corbett favourability of biological characteristics;
of sex rather than gender. In a particularly radical shift from the Corbett favourability of
fixed medical criteria, there is no requirement for one applying for gender reassignment to
have undergone any kind of surgical procedure (S 2) eliminating the pre/post-operative
distinction. Furthermore, the acquired gender is recognised ‘for all purposes’ (S 9), with an
exemption for sports bodies in order to ensure fair competition (S 19 (2) (a)). Whilst this goes
some way to recognising the psychological aspect of gender and no doubt a positive move
away from Corbett, Cowan notes that there is still a reliance on medical expert opinion in the
submission of evidence to the Gender Recognition Panel: ‘[t]here is no telling what kinds of
views on sex or sexuality those “experts” will hold’ (Cowan, 2005: p.76). Sharpe further
notes that ‘the grounding of claims in disability has obvious potential for negative discursive
fallout for transgender people, given that of necessity such a strategy relies on a view of
transgender people as psychiatrically disordered’ (Sharpe, 2002: p.138). This medicalisation
of transsexualism as a mental illness was especially present in the House of Lords’ debate on
the Bill, with Baroness O’ Cathain equating transsexualism with other irrational phobias or
delusions:
‘If a person is paranoid and believes that he is being chased by secret agents, we do
not hire a 24-hour bodyguard and buy them elaborate security devices. Similarly, if a person
suffers from agoraphobia, we do not brick them into their home. Yet, instead of getting them
all possible psychological help, surgeons trap transsexual people in their delusion by
performing sex reassignment surgery’ (HL Deb, 2003: Col 1310).
The medicalisation of transsexualism in the Gender Recognition Act therefore
preserves in spirit the notion of Corbett that behind the cases of transsexualism there lies an
attainable ‘truth’ of the gendered subject which can be realised through measured,
dispassionate scientific analysis and which precedes the subject itself. As Sandland argues,
the s2 (1) (a) requirement that individuals be first diagnosed as mentally disordered before
they can successfully reassigned reveals the law’s focus on not the expectations of the
individual applicant, but on the ‘truth’ of the medical diagnosis. The Gender Recognition Act,
therefore, requires transsexuals to ‘forever abandon their gender ambiguity in return for
recognition’ (Sandland, 2009: p.255).
Furthermore, Whittle notes the dubious nature of the requirement that those already
married or in civil partnerships end their current marriage or civil partnership and register a
new one, either a marriage under the Matrimonial Causes Act or a civil partnership under the
Civil Partnerships Act 2004 as ‘simply a sop to the Christian lobby’ (Whittle, 2005: p.271).
Sandland is, meanwhile, less forgiving: ‘[a]ny legislation which requires to a happy and
legally valid marriage to have that marriage set aside in order to preserve the purity of an
increasingly outdated ideal can hardly be described as a great leap forward’ (2009: p.255).
Our discussion thus far has largely been concerned with the distinction between sex
and gender and the evolution of the law in recognising this distinction, on grounds which rely
heavily on classical liberalism. However, Cowan argues that this distinction itself is part of
the need to establish a dichotomous framework in which transsexed subjects are made to ‘fit’
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into a certain category, lest they be a threat to the heteronormative order (Cowan, 2005: p.72)
(for Butler, heterosexuality is itself a discursive production; ‘an effect of the sex/gender
system which purports merely to describe it’ (Jagose, 1996: p. 84)). This is further outlined
by Speer and Potter, who, in positing a ‘real world’ application of Butlerian gender concepts
by pairing performativity with discursive psychology, state ‘[h]eterosexism normalizes
heterosexuality and buttresses a rigidly demarcated two gender system (2002: p.174).
Cowan’s further submission is that the Gender Recognition Act merely shifts the focus of
law’s reliance on sex to gender, whilst keeping both categories intact (2005: p.79). As Sharpe
argues ‘reform that is channelled through categories other than sex enables law to distribute
marginal groups around sex whilst maintaining intact a traditional and (bio)logical
understanding of sex’ (Sharpe, 2002: p.138). The question is whether temporality can be a
suitable framework for UK law, rather than the current structuralist framework of binary
gender categories. Is Butler’s philosophy or, perhaps more appropriately, a philosophy of
gender temporality of any practical significance for the UK legal system’s conception of
gender?
The ‘feminist struggle’ and the practical goals of Butlerian concepts
One of the most pressing criticisms of Butler’s conception of gender is that it lacks, or
has so far failed to demonstrate, any political applicability. For instance, Fraser argues that
Butler is ‘deeply anti-humanist’ and that her infamous linguistic obscurity is ‘far enough
removed from our everyday ways of talking and thinking about ourselves to require some
justification. Why should we use such a self-distancing idiom? What are its theoretical
advantages (and disadvantages)? What is its likely political impact? In the absence of any
attention to these issues, [Butler] at times projects an aura of esotericism unredeemed by any
evident gains’ (Fraser, 1995: p.67).
The charge made here is that post-structuralism is inherently abstract and lacks
political applicability or the capacity for true social change. Nussbaum makes a similar point,
and contends that much gender-based scholarship engages in a ‘virtually complete turning
from the material side of life, toward a type of verbal and symbolic politics that makes only
the flimsiest of connections with the real situation of real women’ (Nussbaum, 1999: p.38).
Furthermore, Nussbaum argues that in reality, linguistic obscurity conceals simplistic and
unoriginal ideas in Butler’s work:
‘When Butler’s notions are stated clearly and succinctly, one sees that,
without a lot more distinctions and arguments, they don’t go far, and they
are not especially new. Thus obscurity fills the void left by an absence of a
real complexity of thought and argument’ (Ibid: 39)
As has been discussed earlier, the charge that Butler’s idea of performativity is not a
philosophy sui generis is largely true, insofar as it is a reapplication to the field of gender
studies of, amongst others, Nietzschean-Foucauldian conceptions of power with AlthusserianLacanian theories of subject-formation. Nussbaum goes some way to restating Butler’s
performativity in a clear and concise manner. Performativity is, Nussbaum argues, somewhat
backed empirically by the means by which adults treat children based on the gender they
believe the baby to have. If it is a girl, it will be cuddled, bounced if a boy; its crying will be
perceived as anger from a boy, fear from a girl (Ibid: 41). Nussbaum’s critique of Butler is
that the supposition that there is nothing inert in babies prior to their experience via
discursive constraints such as gender lacks an empirical basis. Nussbaum contends that Butler
instead prefers ‘to remain on the high plane of metaphysical abstraction’ (Ibid). rather than
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engage in empirical applications of performativity. Furthermore, Fraser contends that Butler’s
dismissal of subjectivation (by viewing subjects as constructed via exclusion – the ‘one’ and
the ‘other’) demonstrates irreverence to the feminist struggle and lacks historical merit
(Fraser, 1995: pp. 68-69). The submission Fraser makes, therefore, is to reformulate both
post-structuralism and Critical Theory, in which ‘we might conceive subjectivity as endowed
with critical capacities and as culturally constructed (Ibid: 71). What seems to be the main
critique of Butler from Nussbaum, meanwhile is that her work is built on a quietism in which
Foucauldian systems of power become inescapable; subversions of perceived norms
becoming the preferred means of resistance (Butler, 1997). As Nussbaum argues, slavery and
laws regarding rape ‘were changed by feminists who would not give parodic performance as
their answer, who thought that power, where bad, should, and would, yield before justice’
(Nussbaum, 1999: p. 43) How, then, might one seek to liberate Butlerian notions of power
and subject-formation from this defeatism or constraint to the purely theoretical? Is such
liberation possible?
As has been demonstrated already, the UK legal system has made some significant
progress in acknowledging the non-essentialist nature of gender, demonstrated by the grant of
significant rights to transsexuals. This notion of non-essentialism, however, is not strictly
Butlerian, or even Beavourian. Non-essentialist conceptions of gender exist in philosophical
texts much earlier than The Second Sex, or Gender Trouble, such as in John Stuart Mills’
essay On the Subjection of Women: ‘I deny that anyone knows, or can know, the nature of the
two sexes, as long as they have only been seen in their present relation to one another...’ here,
Mills seems to be acknowledging the specifically discursive nature of gender, that it is
defined according to what it is set against. Furthermore ‘[w]hat is now called the nature of
women is an eminently artificial thing — the result of forced repression in some directions,
unnatural stimulation in others’ (Mill, 1998: p. 453).
It is argued that the problem with a sincere application of Butlerian concepts as a way
to structure social change is that, if Butler is read as a continuance of Foucault, such
Foucauldian systems of power, with the denial of individual agency and the scepticism
regarding inert characteristics which precede discursive influences, are also inherently
sceptical of the possibilities for social change. As Boucher argues ‘[t]he problem is that this
[Foucaldian interpretation] arguably resulted in a form of objectivist determinism that
prevents the emergence of effective resistance while mechanically reducing the subject to an
effect of institutional socialisation’ (Boucher, 2006: p. 123). Butler goes some ways to
distinguishing her ideas of subject-formation and agency from Foucault in her contributions
to Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (‘[i]t does not follow...that we are all always-already
trapped, and that there is no resistance to regulation or to the form of subjection that
regulation takes’) (Butler, Laclau & Žižek, 2000: p. 151). However, Butler still remains
fundamentally sceptical, if not dismissive, of the positive effects of social and political
change. In the case of rights to marriage for gay and lesbian couples, for instance, she argues
‘those who seek marriage identify not only with those who have gained the blessing of the
state, but with the state itself. Thus the petition not only augments state power, but accepts the
state as the necessary venue for democratization itself’ (Ibid: 176). In other words – in order
to view the acceptance of transsexuals as a political end, one first needs to accept that the
state assigned the signifying role of who is acceptable and who is not in the heteronormative
framework. The Gender Recognition Act, therefore, is not only essentialist, but is still part of
a larger regulatory contingency of discursive and regulatory constraints on the sexual conduct
of individuals, which harkens back to Foucault (1991).
This does not, however, imply that there is no place for Butler’s brand of poststructuralism within legal discourse and as Herstein argues, Butler’s theory and poststructuralism in general is best read as a scepticism of grand, unifying moral theories,
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institutions, etc. rather than a rejection of them outright (2010). What seems to be obvious
throughout Butler’s work is an implicit assumption that individuals should be fairly
represented in the law and that regulation ‘determines, more or less, what we are, what we
can be’ (2001). Whilst Sharpe praises the Gender Recognition Act for its renunciation of the
requirement for individuals to undergo sex-reassignment surgery, ‘[the] law has not divorced
itself from a concern with the body’ (2009). In other words, the Gender Recognition Act is an
exercise of biopolitical power, in which the ‘self’ of gender is exercised through a
legal/discursive fixation on the body as opposed to ‘a self that is beyond discourse itself’
(Butler, 2001). Whilst it is clearly not the place of law to ruminate on such concepts as the
metaphysical self or notions of ‘I’ and it is difficult to imagine a discursive construction of
that which is outside discourse, we can still aim to detach legal discourse from the structured
binary categories in which the exercise of biopolitical elaborations of male and female leave
the transsexual self without legal expression – as legal unmentionables whose existence is
merely disruptive of the heteronormative order and is to be medicalised and remedied – the
subject brought back to the fray through the act of recognition. Butlerian thought, therefore,
might view the Gender Recognition Act as a piece of legislation which still falls into the same
trap of Corbett, since it treats transsexuals as subjects to be identified according to a
supposedly objective biopolitical criteria, regulated and treated as mentally disordered and
then reassigned into a binary order which itself remains undisrupted.

Conclusion
As has been demonstrated, there has been significant progress in the role of
democratization with regards to transsexual individuals. Where the law set out by Corbett
treated transsexuals people as non-persons, there is now a recognition that gender dysphoria
is a serious issue for a minority of people in the United Kingdom. The Labour government
was especially forthcoming in granting democratic rights to individuals suffering from a lack
of legal recognition of the gender they actually inhabit. Whittle and others have criticised the
bill on these classically liberal terms, arguing that, for all its positive aspects, the Gender
Recognition Act still treats transsexuals as people suffering from congenital disorders.
Nonetheless, if we accept the liberal framework, the Gender Recognition Act is a positive
move forward.
What the Gender Recognition Act 2004 fails to do, however, is consider the
possibility of an order beyond the binary notions of male and female and treats transsexuals
as individuals subject to assimilation within a heteronormative framework. The Corbett test
used the scientific ‘reality’ of sex as its basis for denying transsexuals rights and the Gender
Recognition Act 2004, similarly, uses the language of scientific certainty to make the law’s
focus the ‘truth’ of the gender of the applicants as opposed to the applicant’s selfidentification. The individual ‘is brought back into the gendered order and their problematic
past...is rendered, so far as law can do it, invisible’ (Sandland, 2009: p. 254). What this essay
has demonstrated is that other possibilities for conceptualising transsexuals in the legal sphere
do exist and may in fact be more useful than the current adopted framework in providing
transsexuals with the recognition that they need and deserve.
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